Lecturer: Miriam Kyselo
Fields: philosophy, cognitive science
Content
There has been a paradigm change in views of the self. The self is no longer an abstract entity, situated or realized by our individual brains. It is seen as embodied instead and likely as being co-constituted through our relations and interactions with others. In this course we explore recent theories of selfhood stemming from the field of so-called embodied and enactive cognition. We will discuss the self both from a third-personal “objective” perspective (as a living entity) and from a first-personal, subjective perspective (as lived or experienced entity). An important question to be explored is the extent to which the embodied self should be seen as a genuinely social and relational phenomenon.
Literature
- Di Paolo, E., Rohde, M., & De Jaegher, H. (2010). Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play. In Enaction: Towards a new paradigm for cognitive science. MIT press
- Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends in cognitive sciences, 4(1), 14-21.
- Gallagher, S., & Daly, A. (2018). Dynamical relations in the self-pattern. Frontiers in psychology, 664.Heersmink, R. (2020). Varieties of the extended self. Consciousness and Cognition, 85, 103001.
- Hutto, D. D., & Ilundáin-Agurruza, J. (2020). Selfless activity and experience: Radicalizing minimal self-awareness. Topoi, 39(3), 509-520.
- Kyselo, M. (2014). The body social: an enactive approach to the self. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 986.
- Lindblom, J. (2020). A radical reassessment of the body in social cognition. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 987.
- Maiese, M. (2019). Embodiment, sociality, and the life shaping thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 18(2), 353-374.
- Thompson, E. (2005). Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 4(4), 407-427.
Lecturer
Miriam Kyselo is a philosopher and cognitive scientist. She received a PhD from the Institute of Cognitive Science University of Osnabrueck. Since 2020 she holds the position of Associate Professor at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Her expertise is in philosophy of cognition, especially the so-called 4E approaches (enacted, extended, embodied, embedded aspects of the mind), philosophy of psychology, as well as interdisciplinary research in embodied cognitive science.